Law and Economics Paper #6
Virtually every aspect of life as we know it, is a struggle between the haves and the have nots. Justice, often characterized as blind and impartial offers a promise to the have nots --- that despite the disparity in economic status, the have nots may still be able to defend their rights through the courts of law, a place where it is possible to get ahead of the competition even with scarce economic resources.
Although the disposition of justice merely involves the application of laws crafted to ensure fairness and equity, extraneous factors come into play as well. Albiston, in her article “ The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing By Winning,” explores these factors in relation to the federal employment statutes and Family and Medical Leave Act. I agree with Albiston when she said that some forms of winning claims are, in the bigger scheme of things, losses to the one-shot players (employees) than to the party (repeat-players, or often, employers) who ends up paying the claim.
Out of court settlements or cases settled in the arbitration level are highly encouraged by the courts and the law. Hence, in our legal system, we have conciliatory measures in the barangay level, mediation level, pre-trial level (referral to commissioner) and even during and after the trial proper. Settling cases even before a full blown trial proves to be an efficient way of minimizing the use of resources (expending time, money, emotional and physical efforts). In the long run, however, a quick settlement at the arbitration level serves to bind only the parties concerned and does not in any way enrich jurisprudence. As a result, one-time players (usually the “have nots” are not able to generate enough muster backed by jurisprudence in order to support future claims by members of the same class.
What Albiston proposes, is that the haves are masterminds of a plot to ensure that jurisprudence would always end up in their favor and if there exists a possibility that a decision would affect future business or dealings, the haves would more likely settle, even if it involves the payment of a big claim. Although the postulate has shades of a conspiracy theory, it is a rational explanation of behavior through an economic perspective. Indeed, it would be more efficient if repeat players strategize to ensure wins in every court case, in order to avoid harmful jurisprudential precedents. It is unfortunate, however, that strategy does not really enter a one-time player's mind since, for have nots, immediate relief is the economic.
Although the disposition of justice merely involves the application of laws crafted to ensure fairness and equity, extraneous factors come into play as well. Albiston, in her article “ The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing By Winning,” explores these factors in relation to the federal employment statutes and Family and Medical Leave Act. I agree with Albiston when she said that some forms of winning claims are, in the bigger scheme of things, losses to the one-shot players (employees) than to the party (repeat-players, or often, employers) who ends up paying the claim.
Out of court settlements or cases settled in the arbitration level are highly encouraged by the courts and the law. Hence, in our legal system, we have conciliatory measures in the barangay level, mediation level, pre-trial level (referral to commissioner) and even during and after the trial proper. Settling cases even before a full blown trial proves to be an efficient way of minimizing the use of resources (expending time, money, emotional and physical efforts). In the long run, however, a quick settlement at the arbitration level serves to bind only the parties concerned and does not in any way enrich jurisprudence. As a result, one-time players (usually the “have nots” are not able to generate enough muster backed by jurisprudence in order to support future claims by members of the same class.
What Albiston proposes, is that the haves are masterminds of a plot to ensure that jurisprudence would always end up in their favor and if there exists a possibility that a decision would affect future business or dealings, the haves would more likely settle, even if it involves the payment of a big claim. Although the postulate has shades of a conspiracy theory, it is a rational explanation of behavior through an economic perspective. Indeed, it would be more efficient if repeat players strategize to ensure wins in every court case, in order to avoid harmful jurisprudential precedents. It is unfortunate, however, that strategy does not really enter a one-time player's mind since, for have nots, immediate relief is the economic.
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